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1 Introduction  
 
There has been a considerable amount of thought levied upon the question of legitimate 
governance.  As John Locke phrased it, it’s not a matter of whether or not there should 
be political power rather the great question is upon whom that political power is 
entrusted.  In modern day political parlance, the answer to this great question is found 
in democracy.  Democratization as a legitimizing theory is understood and widely 
accepted within the context of the nation-state. However, democratization as a 
legitimizing theory outside the context of the nation-state is not so well understood nor 
accepted.  With the emergence of globalization and international integration, to what 
extent democratic theories can or should be extrapolated to legitimize trans-national and 
supra-national institutions are of great value.   
 
Deliberations on this topic are vast and stratified.  Many political and legal theorists 
have employed a democratic standard to examine the legitimacy of international 
institutions ranging from the United Nations (UN), to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), to the European Union (EU).  If one were to accept the basic normative 
premise that a democratization of political power results in a legitimate government 
then it can be deduced that legitimizing power can be realized by instituting democratic 
structures.  If, however, democratic structures are absent or incomplete then 
legitimization is either lacking, nonexistent or must be found by some other means. 
 
The EU has been a featured target of many scholars who argue that its institutions are 
not entirely democratic.  This lack of democratic integrity has been termed the 
“democracy deficit” and can be understood as “the gap between the powers transferred 
to the Community level and the control of the elected Parliament over them, a gap filled 
by national civil servants operating as European experts or as members of regulation 
and management committees, and to some extent by organized lobbies, mainly 
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representing business.”1  If the EU does indeed have a democratic deficit, then must it 
not also suffer to some level a crisis of legitimacy?   
 
Questioning the democratic integrity of the EU is a bit like following the white rabbit 
down the rabbit hole; the journey starts with one question but ends with infinitely more.  
After all, what is democracy?  Held has been a good source for chronicling models of 
democracy in both a historical and modern context.2  Many other authors have added to 
this discussion by offering characterizing features of democracy.3  This thesis does not 
endeavor to enter the debate over democracy or argue for one model over the next.  
However, it is important for the reader to understand that the democracy deficit debate 
rests first upon an initial argument over what democracy is.  What follows are even 
more questions— Should the EU be democratized? Is it even possible to democratize 
the EU?  Are there consequences to democratizing the EU and if so, could the costs be 
too high?  If it is possible and desirable to democratize the EU, how would 
democratization look and how would it work?  For each question, there is a cleavage 
making for an extensive number of legitimizing theories.  
 
Within the EU democracy deficit debate there are two main initial branches of thought.  
There are those who desire to democratize and then there are those who do not.  For 
those who do posses a desire for democratization, there is an additional branch.  From 
this group there are some who believe that democratization is not possible however 
desirable it may be, and then there are others that both desire democratization and 
believe it to be possible.  From this point the question is either how to handle the 
negative consequences of the democratic deficit or how to go about solving the deficit.4  
Included in this taxonomy is an ongoing epistemological battlefield over the heart of the 
EU: what is it and what it should become? 
 
                                                
1 Williams (1991) p. 162. 
2 See both Held1(1995) and (1996). 
3 Follesdal (1998). 
4 Credit for the referenced classification: Karisson (2001) pgs. 130-140. 
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Weiler sets the stage for this discussion with his writings on the “constitution of 
Europe”.5  This rich phrase calls to question a myriad of elements of European 
integration: its composition, its founding principles, its founding documents, its 
evolution, etc.  The EU has many legal institutions and a complex structure that opens 
up a number of possible ways for it to be democratically deficient as each EU 
institution—the Council, the Commission, the Parliament, the Presidency and the 
Courts—must pass a test of legitimacy.  This constitutional understanding demands that 
not only must each institution be legitimate itself in connection to the member states, 
but they must also be legitimate in relation to each other.6 
 
Much of the arguments regarding democratization fall within three groups: competitive 
democracy, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy.  Competitive 
democracy calls for policy creation as the result of political competition.7  Having a 
competitive system insures that those currently in power must react to the will of the 
polity or risk being replaced by a “government in waiting”.8  The most common reform 
is the increase of the European Parliament’s legislative powers.9  Heidrum Abromeit 
who argues that democratizations should come about by direct participation best 
exemplifies the group advocating for participatory democracy.10  Deliberative 
democracy is a recent attraction to many democratic scholars.11  Deliberative 
democracy is a process that narrows down preferences through discourse.  There are 
also social theories that argue that EU must also look to its social responsibilities and 
that it currently does not reflect the will of the average European citizen and that there 
is a policy drift from voter preference at the EU level.12 
                                                
5 Weiler (1999); Weiler, Haltern and Mayer (1995); Weiler and Wind (2003).  See also 
Mancini (2000). 
6 See Andersen and Burns (1996) for the argument that executive power has overtaken 
national parliamentary power.  See also Raunio (1999). 
7 See Beitz (1989) and Schattschneider (1960) for views of democracy as a competitive 
political system. 
8 For examples see Miller (1983) p. 133-155 and Schumpeter (1952). 
9 Williams (1991). 
10 Abromeit (1998). 
11 See Bessette (1981); Joerges and Neyer (1997a) pgs. 273-229; Joerges and Neyer, 
(1997b) pgs. 609-625; Joerges and Everson (2000) p 164-188. 
12 See Joerges (2005) and Joerges and Rödl (2009) for social deficit arguments and see 
Scharpf (1997) and (1999) for policy drift arguments.   
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Those seeking not to democratize the EU can be said to be advocates of the status quo.  
The first half of this group are those who desire democratization but do not think it is 
possible.  Accordingly, instead of finding ways to democratize the EU, they advocate 
that the negative impacts resulting from the democracy deficit should be disarmed.13  
The other half of the status quo group contends that there is nothing wrong with the 
EU’s democracy deficit.  The prominent thinkers here are Majone and Moravcsik.14 
 
With the understanding that there are many elements to the democracy deficit debate in 
the EU, this paper will address only one.  Particularly, this thesis will concentrate upon 
the theories of Giandomenico Majone.  Majone advocates that the EU should not be 
judged as an institution requiring further democratizing.  Instead, the EU should be seen 
as a regulatory state.  There are many elements of regulatory theory, however, this 
thesis will concentrate solely on Majone’s arguments.15  One of the essential 
characteristics of regulatory regimes for Majone is that they are insolated from 
democratic rule and therefore the current democratic deficit of the EU is not a bug but a 
feature.  The effort of this thesis will be to address shortcomings in the assertion that the 
EU as a regulatory state is a legitimate and functional means of supra-national 
governance.  Majone’s regulatory state thesis, like all of the aforementioned arguments 
over the democracy deficit, is a means of producing legitimate rule within Europe.  This 
legitimizing framework will be referred to as the Majone framework.  Majone contends 
that so long as specific actors produce specific policy, then the EU as a regulatory state 
does not require democratization in order to be legitimate.  Furthermore, Majone 
contends that not only is the regulatory state a legitimate form of supra-national 
governance, it is also the most effective means of producing policy.  There are two 
important parts to the Majone framework.  The first is a normative claim and a second 
is an empirical claim.  The normative claim derives from the legitimizing power of non-
majoritarian rule.  The purpose of this thesis is to test the empirical implication that the 
                                                
13 See Scharpf (1994) pgs. 219-242; Scharpf (1996a), pgs. 136-155; Scharpf (1996b) p. 
15-40. 
14 See Moravcsik (1998a), (1998b), (2002), (2003), (2004) and Majone (1993a), 
(1993b), (1994), (1996), (1997), (1998), (2000), (2002a) and (2002b). 
15 See Majone (1994) for a full treatment of the Majone regulatory thesis. 
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regulatory state is functional while also being legitimate.  I will test this functionally 
assertion by using the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Greek Sovereign Debt 
Crisis (SDC) as empirical tests.  For that purpose, this thesis will operate under the 
assumption that Majone’s normative claim is correct. 
 
The first chapter of this thesis is devoted to Majone’s explanation of his regulatory state 
thesis.  Here, the argument for the legitimacy and desirability of non-majoritarian rule 
rather than majoritarian rule will be spelled out.  The second chapter is an explanation 
of the GFC and the SDC.  These two crises are used to put the Majone framework into 
an empirical context exposing its functional limitations at addressing the demands of 
increased European integration.  Chapter three analyzes the empirical implications rose 
by the GFC and the SDC by highlighting the functionality flaws of the regulatory state.  
This analysis results with the suggestion that the EU is faced with the dilemma between 
choosing a legitimate yet dysfunctional government or an illegitimate yet functional 
government.  As this is not a desirable choice, chapter four endeavors to reform 
Majone’s non-majoritarian legitimizing framework so that it is more functional.  It is 
possible to make the EU more functional within Majone’s legitimizing framework but 
this product could prove to have other undesirable effects casting doubt on its long-term 
sustainability.  In this light, this thesis ends with a discussion over the nebulous nature 
of the EU and suggests that the inability to adequately define what it is and what it 
should become is a fundamental problem.  The democracy deficit debate is essentially a 
European identity crisis writ large.  This fundamental disagreement is the antecedent to 
all other disagreements over legitimate political power in Europe.  As a consequence, 
finding a balance between a EU that is both functional and legitimate cannot occur until 
the EU and its purpose are better defined and agreed upon. 
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2 THE MAJONE FRAMEWORK 
2.1 From a Positive State to a Regulatory State 
 
During the nineteenth century, Henri de Saint-Simon, a wild-eyed idealist in his day, 
envisioned that society would transform itself into a government of experts.  Fueled on 
the vogue promise of Newtonian mechanics’ affect on social order, Saint-Simon figured 
that science and reason would produce and necessitate a new ruling elite.  According to 
Saint-Simon, “the government of man will be replaced by the administration of things,” 
and these administrators “qualified by their superior talents,” would replace the 
traditional political actor whose leadership is wrought from self-interest and ignorance 
with the rational and skilled expert.16 
 
While a complete actualization of Saint-Simon’s vision has not come to pass, one can 
see vestiges of the “rule by skilled elites” premise in today’s governments in the form 
of regulatory bodies that rely upon the expertise of individuals to govern the 
complexities of modern societies.  Majone favors the basic notion that there are some 
sectors of governance whose stewardship is best delegated to regulators over politicians 
and has chronicled what he believes is a steady shift in that direction.  This shift can be 
seen in the reduced role for the positive state and a corresponding increase in the role of 
the regulatory state. 
 
According to Majone, the positive state is characterized by its intervention and was the 
hallmark of post-WWII European democracies.  During this period, the positive states 
of Europe attached themselves to redistributive, tax and spend policies of the so-called 
                                                
16 For a full treatment of Saint-Simon’s ideology see Letters from an Inhabitant of 
Geneva to His Contemporaries 1803.  Quotations attributed to Saint-Simon taken from 
Siedentop (2000) p. 32 and Hewett (2008). 
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“Keynesian Welfare State” era.  Governments of this era sought to control and regulate 
their societies by nationalizing key markets and industries.  Intervention by this means 
failed, however, and “in one country after another, publicly owned firms came under 
fire for failing to achieve their social as well as their economic objectives; for their lack 
of accountability; and for their tendency to be captured by politicians and trade 
unions.”17  
 
The failures of the positive state in Europe has been exacerbated by globalization, 
economic integration, and the EU, where member states’ ability to tax and spend (or 
borrow) has been considerably hamstrung by law.  Since the late 1970s European 
governments have accordingly been forced to reject and change their traditional modes 
of governance and adopt reform in the shape of privatization, liberalization, welfare 
reform, and deregulation18. Rule making rather than redistribution has therefore become 
the emerging prominent form of policy; and the technocratic expert rather than the 
elected politician has become the most important actor. 
 
With this transition into delegated rule making, a question of legitimacy emerges.  If a 
government’s legitimacy is still to be judged upon its democratic structure then a 
regulatory state where key policy makers are insulated from the democratic process can 
be found wanting.  Majone responds to this charge with a thesis that pivots the 
discussion away from democracy as the preferred source of legitimacy.  Instead, 
Majone highlights failures with the majoritarian democratic process and argues that 
these failures represent the true wounds to EU legitimacy.  Majone’s thesis can be 
distilled down to three essential points: the first relates to the accountability dilemma of 
majoritarian rule; the second relates to the tyranny of the majority over the minority; 
and the third relates to a change in standard setting that places a premium on 
effectiveness over democracy for legitimacy.  Each of these above points will be 
explored in the following sections. 
 
 
                                                
17 Majone (1996) pgs. 11-23. 
18 Majone (1997) p.143, for explains on deregulation.  
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2.2 The Accountability Dilemma of Majoritarian Democracy 
 
There is a reason why policy makers choose to delegate their power.  Some advance 
cognitive factors such as the dearth of competence and expertise among legislative 
bodies to convene on complex issues.19  Others advance a blame-avoidance theory 
where policy makers wish to avoid the consequences of policy failures by spreading the 
guilt around and thus dampening their responsibility.20  Majone sees merit with both 
explanations but concludes that for the EU, the need to achieve credible policy 
outcomes has been a primary motivator for the rise of the regulatory state. 
 
Democratic policymaking has a credibility problem.21  The pro tempore nature of 
democratic lawmaking means that these lawmakers are under time constraints to pass 
policy.22  Once a policy objective is initiated, there is nothing to prevent a successive 
legislature from changing policy in another direction. Because politicians have an 
interest to seek re-election, they are not necessarily motivated to consider long-term 
policy interests of the polity over their own short-term interest of re-election.  As a 
result, long-term policy commitments are difficult.  Majone defines this as the 
accountability dilemma.  The accountability dilemma exemplifies the demarcation lines 
separating the political actors of majoritarian democratic procedure from the 
technocratic expert of delegated regulatory regimes. “[I]n seeking re-election, 
legislators engage in advertising and position-taking rather than in serious policy-
making, or they design laws with numerous opportunities to help particular 
constituencies.  In either case, re-election pressures have serious consequences for the 
quality of legislation.”23 
 
Within a nation-state, credibility issues can be subdued by the coercive power of the 
state, but as Majone points out, this is not possible to do outside national borders and is 
                                                
19 McCubbins and Page (1987) pgs. 409-25. 
20 Fiorina (1981) p. 33-36, at 47. 
21	  See Kydland and Prescott (1997) for the value of fixed rules over discretion.  
22	  Linz (1998). 
23 Majone (1996) p. 291. 
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particularly not feasible for the EU. As nation-states become increasingly integrated and 
laws are established in response to this interconnectedness, it becomes all the more 
important to establish credible policy.  Foreign governments and international economic 
actors who must plan their strategies on a forecast of long-term thinking will only 
respond to credible policy.   
 
2.3 The Tyranny of the Majority over the Minority 
 
The second point to be discussed, the tyranny of the majority over the minority, has 
many facets to it and plays a central part in Majone’s thesis.  The concept of a “tyranny 
of the majority” has its roots in American political thinking, in particular with James 
Madison.24  Majone employs this concept to distinguish two distinct forms of 
democracy.  Majone characterizes the first form as a radical concept of extreme 
majority rule where a populist, unitary, and centralized government rules upon all 
manners of public life.  On the contrary, “the alternative, or ‘Madisonian’, model aims 
to share, disperse, delegate and limit power.  The over-riding goal is to protect 
minorities from the ‘tyranny of the majority’, and the judicial, executive and 
administrative functions from representative assemblies and from fickle mass 
opinion.”25 
 
If the reader is convinced of these two models of democracy and, more importantly, that 
the regulatory state falls within the Madisonian model (for it is absolutely incompatible 
with the former model), then legitimacy through democratic means isn’t completely off 
the table.  Approaching legitimacy from this angle, however, does come with a 
requirement for procedural legitimacy—democratically enacted agencies with clearly 
defined legal authority and objectives; decisions follow from formal rules and public 
participation; decisions must also be justified, transparent and open to judicial review—
that, according to Majone, isn’t difficult to realize.  Majone is a particular fan of the US 
                                                
24 For classical statements of this concept, Majone points readers in the direction of 
Federalist papers numbers 48, 49, and 71. 
25 Majone (1997) p. 159. 
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Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and believes that a similar structure could be 
used in Europe.   
 
An additional requirement, and a very important one at that, is a limit to the kind of 
policy decisions the EU as a regulatory state can make.  Majone’s response to this 
requirement is the argument that regulatory policy outcomes be Pareto-optimal.  Pareto-
optimality, or Pareto-efficiency, is a concept named after an Italian economist, Vilfredo 
Pareto, who sought to define an outcome that made one or more individuals better off 
without making any other individual worse off. Pareto optimality is critical to Majone’s 
framework of a legitimate regulatory state as it isn’t merely a desired characteristic—it 
is a requisite, defining characteristic.  This characteristic has considerable implications 
for the EU as a regulatory state for it limits the types of policy decisions the EU can 
make and still be considered legitimate within Majone’s framework.  Namely, policy 
outcomes need to be Pareto-optimal.26 
 
Majoritarian rule, on the other hand, does not seek Pareto-optimal outcomes.  On the 
contrary, the effect of majoritarian rule is zero-sum where majorities are the “winners” 
and the minorities are the “losers”.  While a democratically governed nation-state can 
legitimately involve itself into zero-sum outcomes, the EU does not have that 
possibility.  The EU as a regulatory state must instead concern itself with functions of 
government control that result in positive-sum outcomes.  What sort of functions does 
that leave the EU?  Majone identifies three essential functions of government control: 
income redistribution, macroeconomic stabilization, and market regulation.  The first 
two are functions of a positive state and the last one is a function of the regulatory state.  
As a result, the EU must shy away from involvement in redistributive or 
macroeconomic policies and instead deal primarily with matters of market correction 
where Pareto-optimal outcomes are possible.27 
 
More than being necessary, this requirement is also practical for addressing the realities 
of strained European integration where deep cleavages divide the polity.  According to 
                                                
26 Majone (1997) pgs, 140-141. 
27 Majone (1996) pgs. 162. 
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Arend Lijphart, non-majoritarian democracy is better suited for plural societies in which 
people are sharply divided along a number of important lines.28  In such a circumstance, 
the fear of the “tyranny of the majority” is more problematic. The EU should, therefore, 
shield itself from the populism of the majoritarian democratic model and instead 
embrace the Madisonian, non-majoritarian model.29 
 
2.4 Standard Setting 
 
Lastly, Majone returns the question of legitimate governance to a fundamental level.  
This thesis started with an assumption that legitimacy is a product of democratic 
structures.  It is important to note that this is indeed just that, an assumption.  Majone 
makes the distinction between standard-setting and standard-using.  Standard-setting is 
a process by which people deliberate and propose standards upon which a proposal is to 
be judged.  Standard-using is the actual task of measuring dimensions of performance 
against set standards.30  According to Majone, we are currently in the standard-setting 
stage and should therefore refrain from using standard-using until an accepted standard 
exists.  The problem with those who advocate that the EU suffers from a democratic 
deficit is that they jump the gun by using a standard before anything has been set.  
According to Majone the current debate tends to use majoritarian standards when it 
shouldn’t.  Instead Majone believes we should be using non-majoritarian standards.31 
 
It is here where Majone’s position takes a confusing turn.  His rejection of a majoritaian 
set of standards for a non-majoritarian set is not the search for an alternative approach 
to democratic legitimacy.  As discussed above, Majone’s vision of a non-majoritarian 
democracy is formulated by an understanding of a Madisonian democracy where his 
particularly attraction is to the more extreme antidemocratic element.  As a result, 
Majone is not asking that the reader be convinced by the democratic quality of his non-
majoritarian premise, quite the contrary.  What Majone is really proposing, though it is 
                                                
28 Lijphart (1984). 
29 Majone (1996) pg. 286. 
30 Majone (1998) p. 5. 
31 Majone (1996) p. 7. 
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obfuscated, is that there is a struggle between the democratic standards based on 
majoritarianism and the standards of efficacy based on the non-majoritarian regulatory 
state.  The EU is more efficient with its democracy deficit than it would be without it.  
If the democracy deficit were to be lessened, the EU would become less effective.  This 
is the new standard upon which the legitimacy of the EU should be judged, not on 
democracy, but it’s effectiveness.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
A fair assessment of the EU as a regulatory state thesis shows that Majone’s conclusion 
follows logically from his premise.  One must therefore either accept his conclusion or 
reject his premise.  A rejection of the premise could follow by a simple repudiation of 
the normative assumptions.  For instance, if one is from the outset unconvinced of the 
legitimacy of anything short of full political integration backed by a democratically 
structured federal European State, then any argument to the contrary, or arguments 
against the efficiency of non-majoritarian rule will fall on deaf ears.  Perhaps a better 
approach, and a more useful one, is to at least nominally accept all of Majone’s 
normative assumptions and instead examine his thesis on empirical grounds for while 
justifications for his thesis are largely normative (non-majoritarian rule is better than 
majoritarian rule at the EU level), they are also dependent on empirical criteria 
(efficiency) that besets the real world.  This thesis will therefore operate under the 
assumption that the Majone framework is legitimate.  If the theoretical framework can 
be shown to not be simpatico with actual reality, then the value of the framework would 
be considerably hamstrung in its applicability to real world European governance.   
 
There are a number of critiques already that point out some of the weaknesses with 
Majone’s thesis when it comes to his framework’s plausibility of working outside of a 
theoretical context and in the real world.  Much of Majone’s framework hinges upon 
the ability of the regulatory state to find Pareto-optimal solutions.  There are some 
studies that suggest is does not.  Friedman and Rogowski have argued that private 
producers for domestic markets are losers from the liberalization of trade in a single 
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market. 32 Others have raised similar critiques arguing that the EU consistently engages 
in policy that produces winners and losers.33  Another relevant critique of Majone 
comes from Scharpf who argues that a separation between negative and positive 
integration is not possible.34  These authors suggest that the Majone framework is 
already not a viable governance strategy due to an existing contradiction within the 
union itself that does not allow for absolute Pareto-optimal policy. While this thesis is 
aware of these criticisms, it is going to operate under the same assumption that the 
Majone framework operates under: that the regulatory state can and must produce 
Pareto-optimal policy.  With this in mind, the effort of this thesis is to examine the 
applicability of Majone’s thesis to European governance through the prism of the GFC 
that started in 2007 and reached a climax in 2010 with the SDC when Greece nearly 
defaulted on their loan obligations.  These two events tested the mettle of the European 
integration project and have exposed, in some part, the nature of the beast in areas that 
used to be purely conjecture.  The following chapter will examine the events leading up 
to the crises and the actions taken in response. 
                                                
32 Friedman and Rogowski (1996). 
33 See Joerges (1999), Pierson and Leibfried (1995). 
34 Scharpf (1996b). 
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3 THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT 
CRISIS 
3.1 The Global Financial Crisis 
 
The affects of the GFC on the EU had its origins in the United States when in 2006 the 
subprime crisis saw a rapid reversal in the prices of the US housing sector.  Many 
factors collided ultimately resulting in the drying up of credit.  With the well dry, the 
financial sector was in crisis.  The problem hit a tipping point in September 2008 with 
the default of Lehman Brothers.  Lenders became reluctant to issue credit and the cogs 
of the mighty American financial machine came to a screeching halt.  Businesses and 
hedgefunds engaged in “fire sales” in the effort to deleverage and decrease their risk.  
These effects quickly spread from Wall Street to Main Street as John Q Public began to 
feel the sting of the crisis and the looming recession.35 
 
Meanwhile in Europe, in the age before the downfall of Lehman Brothers, EU financial 
systems were starting to become affected with some institutions showing solvency 
problems, but there was no evidence that these troubles were significantly problematic 
trans-nationally.36  However, later in 2008 and into 2009, lack of confidence increased 
and major cross-border banks began to notice severe solvency shortages.37 The first 
bank to be rescued was the Belgo-Dutch bank Fortis.  Soon after Belgium, France and 
Luxembourg intervened to rescue the Belgo-French bank Dexia.  What followed was a 
series of national initiatives to guarantee banks.  Calls for coordination at the EU level 
began but the European governments failed initially to come to a consensus when they 
                                                
35 The New York Times (2009). 
36 ECB (2009). 
37 Financial Services Authority (2009). 
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met in early October 2008 short of a general commitment that “negative spill-over 
effects should be avoided.”38 
 
The situation worsened and an emergency summit was convened on 12 October, 2008 
for all of the heads of states of the Eurozone.  The result of this was the Paris 
Declaration, a plan of action endorsed by the EU countries to tackle the crisis through 
cooperation and a resolved commitment to provide liquidity via the central bank, a 
recapitalization of banking institutions, and a guarantee for bank borrowing backed by 
public funds.  With the absence of an ex ante framework, the EU governments gathered 
to organize an ad hoc approach to solving the crisis in an ex post fashion.  This 
framework included a number of significant Commission documents designed to negate 
spillover effects.39  By the summer of 2009, the Commission had approved a total of 
over three and a half trillion Euros to stabilize faltering financial institutions.  As a 
result of this action, many have assessed that the rapid and unified response by the EU 
quelled what could have been a truly devastating state of affairs.40 
 
With the fire put out and what seemed to be the worst behind them, attention of the EU 
was shifted away from crisis management to questions of diagnosis and prevention: 
what happened, why did it happen, how did it happen, and what could be done to make 
sure it would not happen again.  Even with the bulk of the crisis in the rearview mirror, 
it was not clear on what must be done in the future as positions continued to vary on the 
best course of action.  What was more obvious was that the cause of the GFC was due 
in large part to regulatory failure.  According to Cukierman, “The most glaring 
regulatory failures are the rise of an unregulated shadow banking system, the existence 
of compensation packages that encourage excessive risk taking behavior, the too-big-to-
                                                
38 Council of the European Union (2008) pg. 1. 
39 See Communication from the Commission on “The Application of the State Aid 
Rules to Measures Taken in Relation to Financial Institutions in the Context of the 
Current Global Financial Crisis”, OJ C 270, 5.10.2008; Communication from the 
Commission on “The Recapitalization of Financial Institutions in the Current Financial 
Crisis: Limitation of the Aid to the Minimum Necessary and Safeguards against undue 
distortions of Competition”, OJ C 10, 15.1.2009; Communication from the Commission 
on “The Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector”, OJ C 72, 
26.3.2009. 
40 Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2010). 
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fail problem, procylicality in the behavior of financial institutions, and moral hazard 
problems in the rating agencies sector.”41  Others pointed to an overly expansive 
monetary policy 42, a global savings glut43, and inadequate regulating of financial 
institutions.44   
 
For the EU, reaction to the failure of regulation is often a call for the formalization of 
increased cooperation amongst nations in the form of centralized powers for oversight 
and enforcement.  For instance, the Larosiere Report 2009 has called for a number of 
reforms that would strip regulatory authority from the national level and give it to the 
EU level.  Included in the proposed reforms is the creation of the "European Systemic 
Risk Council" (ESRC) to be chaired by the European Central Bank president.  Its duties 
would be to establish a risk warning system, with coordination with the Economic and 
Financial Committee that could take action when local supervisory action is deemed to 
be inadequate.  The Report also calls for detailed criteria for burden sharing during a 
crisis so it is clear for whom the responsibility lies in the event of the need for cross-
border bailouts.  An additional agency, the “European System of Financial Supervisors” 
(ESFS), would be an independent and decentralized regulatory body tasked with day-to-
day supervision and would be involved intimately with all major cross-border 
institutions.45 
 
Another centralized approach suggests the formation of a European banking resolution 
authority.46  In the USA, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is in charge 
of resolving major banking crisis but the EU does not have an equal regulatory body.  
The consequence of this absence is that there is no pan-European authority that can step 
in to dismantle or reorganize failing companies that pose a systemic risk to the union’s 
financial system.  According to Dewatripont et al, the GFC has shown that national 
authorities have no other option but to default to a strategy of bailouts creating a threat 
of moral hazard.  They suggest a model that establishes a single resolution authority 
                                                
41 Cukierman (2010) pg. 2.  
42 Taylor (2009). 
43 Bernanke (2005). 
44 Roubini (2008).  
45 Larosiere (2009).  
46 Strauss-Kahn (2010).  
 17 
that would be responsible for crisis resolution.  This authority would coexist with the 
European Commission who would be responsible for regulating competition in state aid 
control.47  However, in order for this model to be viable, the resolution authority must 
have access to public funds.  Exactly how these funds are to be raised and the 
implications over its governance and its effect on the financial sector remains an open 
question. 
 
Even before the GFC, there have been many who raised concerns over the lack of an ex 
ante framework to establish roles and responsibilities in the event of a crisis.  Leading 
up to the GFC, the EU had no clear guidelines for how to handle liquidity or how the 
function of a EU lender-of-last-resort would work.48  On the solvency side there was a 
clear lack of protocol for the resolution of cross-border banking crisis and fiscal border-
sharing mechanisms.49  Despite these concerns, the EU was able to formulate a 
cooperative strategy on the fly to dampen negative effects of the GFC.  While this is 
good news, it doesn’t necessarily bode well as a long-term strategy.  Once EU wide 
action was taken it was quick and decisive, but it also came not a moment too soon.  
The stirrings of the GFC started years before the European heads of state met in 
October 2008 with clear signs of insolvent European banks in 2007.  With a regulatory 
framework in place the situation may never have reached a boiling point, as proactive 
action would have gone into effect early.  Consider also that the most complicated pan-
European action involved only three countries, all of which have had a history of 
cooperation.  Would the situation be different if more countries were involved, 
especially if those countries had no previous cooperative history?  It seems a realistic 
assumption, considering the trend of European financial integration, that the next time a 
crisis like this occurs it will look far more similar to the situation in the USA.  After all, 
the EU “single passport” policy that enables companies established in one member state 
to provide services in all of the other member states practically guarantees that the need 
                                                
47 Dewatripont, Nguyen, Praet, and Sapir (2010). 
48 Prati and Schinasi (1998), (1999); Schinasi and Teixeira (2006); Nieto and Schinasi 
(2007). 
49 Goodhart (2004); Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006) pgs. 34-57; Mayes, Nieto and 
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to bail out a Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) is not a question of if, but when.50  In light of this 
forecast, it seems prudent that serious consideration and discussion continue over the 
formation of an ex ante framework to govern the course of action when the next crisis 
hits. 
 
With the GFC as a backdrop, European leaders formulated the Europe 2020 Strategy.51  
It succeeds the Lisbon Strategy of the 2000-2010 period and spells out both their vision 
for a brighter tomorrow and the means to achieve it.  Largely building off the Lisbon 
Strategy of 2005, the 2020 strategy focuses on sustainable growth through competition, 
lowering unemployment, investment in both education and R&D, as well as a 
commitment to green energy in light of fears over climate change. However, in the 
midst of drafting the 2020 Strategy, Europe’s attention became quickly diverted away 
from the GFC when it became clear that the Greek economy was perilously close to 
defaulting.  By March 2010, when European Commission President Jose Manuel 
Barroso pleaded with Eurozone countries to provide Greece with aid packages and 
support mechanisms, it became alarmingly clear that the GFC was just the start of 
Europe’s worries.    
 
3.2 The Sovereign Debt Crisis 
 
The story of the Greek default and the SDC starts at the beginning when the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) was first establish. Since the formation of the EU in 1957, 
there had been voices advocating the need for a common currency.  By the time of the 
Maastricht Treat in 1992, the goal of a universal currency became  “the most important 
in the history of the European Community.”52  Once the decision was made in 1999 to 
fully implement the Euro, the dream to see a unified Europe under a common monetary 
policy and a single market was realized. Unlike other monetary unions, though, the 
EMU was formed with no unified fiscal union.  As a tip of the hat to national 
sovereignty, matters of fiscal policy were to remain within the jealously guarded 
                                                
50 Bulter (2009). 
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domain of the member state.  This presented some unique challenges.  Under the 
optimal currency area (OCA) theory, states in a monetary union should have relatively 
homogenous economies.  Within the EMU, varying levels of economic development 
exist with a clear distinction between the core economies of Germany and France, and 
the peripheral economies of the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain).  The marginal 
cost of an OCA has a positive slope meaning that as a monetary union adds more 
economies, especially heterogeneous economies, the marginal costs also go up.  If too 
many diverse economies are added, the increase in costs can outweigh any benefits.  
The stability of the monetary union is therefore dependant upon the stability of each 
economy.  But without the ability to manage fiscal policy, a rather important 
shortcoming emerges in the ability to govern the EMU.  The EMU’s answer to this is 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
 
The SGP’s legal foundation derives from a Council Resolution and two Council 
Regulations.53  Members are under a strict obligation to keep their deficit spending 
south of 3%, which is meant to prevent excess borrowing to manage national finances.54  
Members must also keep their government debt from passing 60% of their GDP.  
Adherence to these standards is designed to ensure the growth and stability of the EMU 
in the absence of a centralized fiscal authority allowing both the benefits of a common 
currency and the protection from intervention into macroeconomic policy making.  To 
ensure the integrity of the SGP, the Commission was tasked with the duty to regulate 
the terms and give the authority to levy fines on member states that failed to live up to 
their duties.  The SGP was especially important for Germany who thought it essential 
that a mechanism was in place to regulate price stability.55  Price stability protects from 
                                                
53 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact (Amsterdam, 
17 June 1997) [Official Journal C 236 of 02.08.1997]; Council Regulation (EC) No 
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and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies; Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure [Official Journal L 209 of 2 August 1997]. 
54 This fiscal obligation starts from Article 104 of the Maastricht Treaty and later 
clarified and sped up by Council Regulation No. 1467/97. 
55 See Article 105 of the Maastricht Treaty: 1. The primary objective of the ESCB shall 
be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the 
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to 
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inflation and sends a reassuring message to investors that a volatile exchange market 
will not compromise their investment.   
 
The SGP has proved anemic and incapable of protecting the EMU from the ravages of 
excessive public spending.  How could the Eurozone, after showing so much promise in 
its early years, fall from grace in a little more than a decade?  The terms of the SGP 
suffered a severe lapse of regulatory control.  The Commission exhibited complacency 
during the middle of the 2000s when the Eurozone was experiencing growth and the 
Euro took a respected place alongside the world’s top currency.  Trade within the 
Eurozone increased and members’ ability to borrow money at a relatively low interest 
enabled countries like Greece, who saw 4% growth during this time, to stimulate their 
economies.  Due to political and social pressures in Greece, the government borrowed 
heavily to sustain services and increase public sector jobs in the effort to curry political 
favor.56  Through a number of underhanded agreements with a multitude of banks, 
Greece cooked their books to make it seem as if their deficit numbers were lower than 
they really were.57  A considerable amount of blame should be placed on the Greek 
government for their malfeasance and their assiduous attempts to disguise it.  That 
being said, even their “cooked” numbers were outside the SGP parameters.  Soon after 
the Papandreou government came to power, it was revealed that the Greek deficit, first 
believed to be an already high 3.7 percent, was in fact a staggering 12.5 percent.  It 
became clear that not only was the Greek Government living outside its means, it had 
been doing so for many years with nary a reaction from the EU. 
 
With a deficit in the stratosphere (there have been estimates putting the true deficit as 
high as 13.6 percent58) and government debt totaling over 120 percent of the GDP59, the 
next step was to figure out how to move forward.  Without an ex ante framework in 
                                                                                                                                         
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in 
Article 2. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in 
compliance with the principles set out in Article 3a. 
56 Kathimerini (2010). 
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place, the EU had to once again resort to ad hoc coordination.  As opposed to their swift 
response to the GFC, reaction to the SDC was considerably more delayed.  The delay 
was principally in part due to a lack of vision on what should be done.  The proposition 
of bailing out Greece in light of their reckless spending left a bitter gall in many 
European mouths but the prospect of leaving them to wither on the vine was considered 
by many to be even more undesirable.  Despite the Greek economy amounting to only 3 
percent of the Eurozone’s GDP, many feared that a default would trigger a catastrophic 
destabilization throughout the entire EMU.  Greece had been borrowing from banks 
throughout the Eurozone, but they were not the only ones to take advantage of cheap 
interest.  European banks had “funneled $2.5 trillion into the five shakiest Eurozone 
economies: Greece, Ireland, Belgium, Portugal and Spain” with no clear plan for 
repayment.60  The fear many had was that should a Greek default occur, a substantial 
number of private banks throughout Europe would not be able to take the hit.  With 
many of these banks residing in “at risk” countries such as Spain, a failure of these 
banks could take down the economies of the peripheral countries, which could in turn 
take down the economies of the core countries, which would result in the destruction of 
the currency and the EMU.  After so many decades of unification and integration, the 
irony is that in the end it was the interconnectedness that put the Eurozone at risk.  
United they stand; united they fall. 
 
While this reality would seem to limit their options, there was one significant legal 
roadblock.  During the Maastricht deliberations, the Germans insisted on a no bailout 
clause.61  The Germans were worried, and with good reason, that the non-disciplined 
economies to the south may in time seek assistance from them.  They wanted it made 
clear that entrance into the Eurozone meant each member state had a responsibility to 
keep their financial house in order.  This would minimize moral hazard and collective 
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action problems.62  They had apparently underestimated the extent of integration’s 
effect and by May 2010 Eurozone governments, despite the no bail-out clause63, came 
to an agreement on a bailout package for Greece.  This 110 billion euro rescue package 
included assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and demands 
implementation of severe austerity measures. 
 
Like the GFC before it, the SDC has raised a number of questions revolving around 
what went wrong and what must change.  The EU’s vision to the future can be seen in 
the 2020 strategy where a commitment to growth includes ensuring the quality and 
sustainability of public finances and addressing macroeconomic imbalances.  A 
realization of this strategy has arrived in part via the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF)64, a new special purpose vehicle designed to preserve financial stability 
in Europe by providing necessary funds to economies in crisis throughout the EU.  
More needs to be done, however, in addressing the root failure of the SDC.  After all, 
something must be terribly wrong when a possible Greek default can pose such a huge 
risk to the entire Eurozone.  The most obvious failure is that of the SGP.65  This failure 
raises concerns over a lack of transparency and regulatory enforcement, and an inability 
of the SGP to stimulate growth and promote competitiveness in the periphery 
economies. 
 
3.3 The Stability and Growth Pact 
 
To better understand where and how the SGP fell short, it is important to first 
understand how it was intended to function.  The primary responsibility of the SGP is to 
constrain excessive fiscal spending by members of the EMU and smooth the impact of 
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asymmetric shocks on real output and inflation in the absence of a centralized fiscal 
authority.66  At the time of its formation it was a remarkable feat of policy coordination 
and before the lead up to the SDC, a casual observer could be excused for believing that 
it was successful in its mission. Hindsight, however, shows that problems had been 
present long before the crisis.   
 
The SGP has two means of enforcement; the first can be described as a preventative 
arm and the other can be described as a corrective arm.67  The preventative arm 
employs soft tactics that includes a survey of self-submitted Stability and Convergence 
Programs, which is a description of a country’s fiscal objectives and their plans to 
achieve their objectives.  Should something be awry, the Commission and the ECOFIN 
Council has the ability to make it public and put public pressure on poorly performing 
countries.68  The corrective arm is stricter and employs formal enforcement to ensure 
fiscal discipline.  Countries with excessive deficits are obliged to resolve it within a 
year.  If the Council is of the opinion that sufficient progress has not been made, they 
may give notice to the offending country.  If after 10 months the member state is still 
non-compliant, sanctions can be levied by the issuance of a non-interest-bearing deposit 
or fines.69  All of the above measures are not automatic but open to the discretion of the 
Council. 
 
Greece was hit hard by the GFC, but even before the crisis they had the highest deficit 
of any other member country.  Their public spending and wage growth outpaced 
productivity making their economy uncompetitive.  While Greece has exceeded the 3 
and 60 percent deficit and debt cap for nearly every year since their introduction in the 
EMU, the Council never imposed any fines or sanctions on them.  In fact, the Council 
decided to abrogate the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) for Greece in 2007 despite 
its high deficit.  The situation in Portugal is very similar.  They have also seen high 
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deficit and public debt numbers in excess of the 3 and 60 limit.  They also did not 
receive any fines or sanctions.  Does this point to a fundamental flaw in regulatory 
enforcement?  Perhaps, but to suggest that the failure of the SGP was primarily due to a 
lack of enforcement may ignore another significant issue.   
 
In contrast to Greece and Portugal, Spain and Ireland have been top performers under 
the SGP criteria but have also been devastated by the GFC.  This suggests that, 
“seemingly sustainable public finances are not enough to promote the necessary level of 
economic health and stability in a currency union.”70  What all of the failing countries 
in the EMU show is a lack of savings during the boom times to have something to fall 
back on during the lean times, and a drop in competitiveness in the sector of trade 
goods.71 Traditionally, an economy that loses its competitiveness can devalue by 
lowering the cost of its goods in relation to foreign goods so their imports decrease and 
their exports increase.  The power to impose competitive measures for the Eurozone 
rests with the European Central Bank (ECB) giving very little room for Greece, whose 
options are limited—primarily to wage cuts—to maneuver.72  Fostering 
competitiveness, especially for the PIGS, is therefore very important for long-term 
stability and growth and something that the SGP within the current EU framework has 
not been able to achieve.  That being said, there is a broad consensus that fiscal rules do 
tend to improve fiscal discipline.73  A prudent way forward for the EMU would 
therefore involve an interest to ensure fiscal discipline, prudential savings, and a 
commitment to increase competition as a path to sustainable growth.  
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4 THE FAILURE OF THE REGULATORY STATE 
 
The above overview of the GFC and the SDC has raised a number of questions on the 
state of regulation within the EU and how it relates to the Majone framework of the EU 
as a regulatory state outlined in the first chapter. This thesis has distilled the essence of 
Majone’s argument into the following three core points: first, it provides for better 
policy credibility over majoritarian rule; second, it lessens the negative effects of the 
tyranny of the majority by reaching outcomes that are Pareto-optimal; and finally, it is 
more effective and better suited to the needs and realities of the EU over majoritarian 
rule.  Majone’s primary focus is to provide a framework that legitimizes EU supra-
national governance.  At the same time, Majone assumes that this legitimizing 
framework is also functional.  Events that have since transpired seem to cloud the issue.  
There are two elements to consider, the first is the legitimizing power of the framework 
and the second is its functionality.  This thesis continues to work under the assumption 
that the regulatory state is legitimate.  The task is therefore to see whether or not the 
actions and proposed reforms outlined in chapter two are within the legitimizing 
parameters of Majone’s framework.  If they fall outside the parameters, then they are 
illegitimate.  Their illegitimacy aside, if it so happens that these actions were done out 
of necessity, then this raises concerns over the functionality of legitimate power to 
effectively deal with the crises. It is clear that the regulatory state failed in profound 
ways.  The question is whether that failure is a consequence of legitimate power’s 
inability to effectively govern due to a fundamental flaw in the framework or whether 
the framework is functionally sound, and its failures can be resolved by reform within 
the parameters of legitimate power.  In order to answer this question, this chapter will 
analyze the nature of the EU, the relationship the Majone framework has to this nature, 
and finally to what extent the actions taken in response to the GFC and the SDC as well 
as the proposed reforms are legitimate.   
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4.1 What is the EU? 
 
The venerable English statesman Winston Churchill, during a number of speeches on 
European integration in the 1940s, coined the term “United States of Europe” as a 
vision of what Europe could become.  Others have invoked the image of a European 
federal state including Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman who described the Coal and 
Steel Community, the predecessor of the EU, as a first step in “laying the foundations 
of a European federation.”74  The EU is not a federated state, however.  Instead it is an 
amalgam of varying structures—part supra-national, part trans-national, and part 
international—representing more of a confederation than anything else.   
 
The result of the EU in its present form is the product of two competing tensions.  On 
one hand is the need to centralize competence at a European level to be able to handle 
issues that are intrinsically pan-European and best handled by a European body.  On the 
other hand, there is the need to guard against unnecessary intrusion by a centralized 
authority into areas that are instinctively national and best handled at the local level.  
Where one draws the line between what is national and what is European is not always 
an easy prospect.  This challenge is exacerbated by the competing interests of the 
Pollyannaish-integrators and the Euro-skeptics whose views of the EU and what it 
should look like are diametrically opposed.  The end product is something of a 
compromise—part European, part national, the sum of which fails to become a whole. 
 
 
 
4.1.1 The Majone Framework and the EU 
 
This vision of the EU is exemplified by European integration into a single market and 
the formation of the EMU.  The logic of economic integration, since the formation of 
the Coal and Steel Community, has always been that globalization is an unstoppable 
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force and proper coordination is not only necessary but it is also desirable if done 
correctly.  Opening markets appears to have validated this premise as Europe has 
benefited as a whole through the freeing of trade.  Members to the monetary union also 
have seen remarkable success, the effects of the two crises notwithstanding.  However, 
for all of the advancement economic integration has produced in Europe, its political 
integration by comparison has been considerably stunted.  European nations want all of 
the benefits of integration without the undue cost of dissolving national sovereignty.75  
What results is a product of European compromise—a single market with an EMU, but 
no unified fiscal authority. 
 
This division of competences works quite well within the Majone framework.  The 
three types of government control Majone isolates are income redistribution, 
macroeconomic stabilization, and market regulation.   Of these, the regulatory state can 
only legitimately engage in market regulation.  Taxation, borrowing, wealth 
redistribution, government programs, in short all issues related to positive rule must 
remain within the nation-state.  Does EU economic integration pass muster?  While the 
SGP places limits on how much a member state in the EMU can spend and borrow, it 
does not dictate fiscal policy or determine the social direction a member state would 
like to go.  The ECB is a mere organ dedicated to price stability, a function of market 
correction, which is not designed to interfere with national policy.  In many ways, the 
ECB is the epitome of a Majone regulatory institution: it is independent, insolated from 
politics, and engages in Pareto-optimal rule making.  Keeping this in mind, what would 
happen if the EU started to shy away, even a little bit, from its role as a regulator and 
began to touch policy areas traditionally dedicated to the states?  Would it still be 
legitimate? 
4.1.2 Is the Majone Framework Flexible? 
 
It is not clear to what extent the EU can engage in a bit of wiggle-room within this 
framework and still be considered legitimate.  After all, the EU itself does have a 
budget collected ultimately from European citizens and used, or redistributed, via 
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decisions made in Brussels and not through the member sates.  Would this be an 
example of wealth redistribution by an unelected body worthy of disdain and shouts of 
“no taxation without representation”?  Not according to Majone as the EU budget is so 
small compared to its GDP (1.3 percent), it is simply not enough to matter.76  At what 
point would it begin to matter, though—2 percent, 5 percent, or 7 percent?  The same 
can be asked of the SGP.  The introduction of the SGP was met with backlash by some 
who saw it as an intrusion into national sovereignty.  Some propose that this backlash 
could set back European integration by decades.77  At what point could the terms of the 
pact, or its enforcement, be considered to significantly affect fiscal policy to an extent 
that it no longer could be considered legitimate within the framework?  And finally, 
what would happen to the legitimacy of the ECB if it became a bank-of-last-resort or 
engaged in other minor acts of redistribution? 
 
It seems fair to characterize the Majone framework as not being completely absolute in 
its terms.  If it were, the EU budget would not be permissible no matter how small; and 
the SGP, where it limits state freedom in macroeconomic affairs, albeit with the lightest 
of hands, would similarly be inconsistent under an absolute interpretation.  That being 
the case, it is also fair to say that the Majone framework should not be construed to be a 
flexible organ.  Majone’s thesis extols the benefits of non-majoritarian rule.  In 
addition, it argues for giving a wide berth to traditional majoritarian rule-making to 
enhance legitimacy.  By becoming more majoritarian, the EU would thusly loose the 
benefits of nonmajoritarian rule and become less legitimate.  Any amount of straying 
into majoritarian rule making would therefore serve no purpose within the framework.  
This thesis asked the question to what extent rule making could stray into majoritarian 
policy and still be legitimate.  The answer seems to be: if one were to ask such a 
question they would be missing the whole point of the framework. 
 
4.2 Undesirable and Illegitimate Reaction to the GFC and the SDC 
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With the understanding that the Majone framework is not to be construed as being 
overly flexible in the desirability or legitimacy of increased majoritarian rule making at 
the European level, the European response to the crises and many of the proposed 
reforms to coordinate and centralize EU policy would therefore have to be seen as being 
both undesirable and illegitimate.  This is due to the introduction of macroeconomic and 
wealth redistribution policies enacted to stem the effects of the GFC and the SDC. 
 
4.2.1 Undesirable and Illegitimate Reaction to the GFC 
 
The threat that the GFC posed to Europe was a systemic or macro risk coupled with 
what has been termed the too-big-to-fail problem.  When small financial institutions 
fail, the effects are negligible to society.  The societal costs involved with the failure of 
large financial institutions, however, are significant.  In order to prevent the systemic 
risk associated with the failure of a large financial institution, a government can step in 
and bail out the failing financial institution.  A bailout comes with its own costs, 
however, as public money must be used to keep a failing financial institution afloat.  
Whenever the negative social costs of a failed financial institution outweigh the cost of 
a bailout, then that financial institution is TBTF.  The TBTF problem is a result of a 
realization that a TBTF institution knows that they are TBTF.  This realization 
incentives a TBTF institution to engage in excessive risk as they know that they have “a 
get out of jail free card”.  This puts governmental authorities between a rock and a hard 
place: they either must bailout a TBTF institution and thereby encourage bad behavior 
in the future or not respond and be faced with the severe crisis of confidence in 
financial markets.  This problem is especially complicated in the EU where there is no 
clear framework on how to deal with pan-European TBTF institutions. 
 
The slow creep of financial integration has confronted the EU with the trilemma of 
financial supervision.78  There is a fundamental incompatibility between integration, 
financial stability and independent national supervision.  Before the GFC, it was hoped 
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that a decentralized approach to regulatory oversight would be sufficient so long as 
there was adequate coordination amongst the many national supervisors.  It is now clear 
that these modes of coordination were not sophisticated enough to match the level of 
integration of European financial institutions and Pan-European banks. 
 
Without a framework in place for a EU response to a banking crisis, the primary 
responsibility for regulatory oversight and bailing out a failing bank would default to 
what it had always been, the authorities of the country the failing bank resides in.  If a 
TBTF institution showed signs of failing, it would be a national prerogative.  The GFC 
has shown that Europe is far more integrated than this strictly national approach would 
allow.  Fortis and Dexia in particular are emblematic that banks are becoming less 
national and more European as they are situated in more than one country.  When one 
country by itself cannot resolve a failing bank or if the consequences of a failed bank 
significantly affect more than one country, it becomes a European issue.  Without a 
framework in place, the EU was forced to develop the ad hoc response outlined in 
chapter two.  The result is increased coordination and enhanced centralized oversight 
that strains the boundaries of legitimacy and desirability under Majone’s framework.   
 
Increased and formalized cooperation is not in and of itself a violation of the Majone 
framework.  In fact, some of the reforms proposed in the Larosiere report that advocate 
for centralized oversight are in line with the tenets of the regulatory state.  Where these 
reforms stray are when they advocate a centralized system of action whereby a EU 
institution is in charge of providing security to pan-European banks.  Of the many 
reforms discussed, the most obvious reform is to formalize the ECB as a lender-of-last-
resort.  It is common for central banks to act as a lender-of-last-resort essentially 
providing reassurance that there is a safety net for institutions in need of liquidity.  It is 
a fitting role for the ECB to step in a play the part of a pan-European lender-of-last-
resort when the systemic risk posed by a failing institution is not controllable by one 
country alone79.  The funds required to fill this role, however, must ultimately come 
from somewhere and because the issuance of these loans are by definition to the most at 
risk institutions, this can make a lender-of-last-resort more of a distributor of liquidity 
                                                
79 Walter and Bergheim (2008). 
 31 
that may or may not see a return.  When one adds the threat of moral hazard from the 
TBTF problem, an ECB as a lender-of-last-resort could become the de facto 
redistributors of European capital to risk prone institutions.   
 
Realizing the threat of moral hazard that would confront the ECB as a lender-of-last-
resort, some have advocated a system whereby European TBTF institutions would be 
subject to a special tax.80  The purpose of this tax would be to lessen the burden on the 
taxpayer for the future costs associated with bailouts.  Taxation, however, is not a 
function of the regulatory state and would therefore violate the Majone framework.  
Another proposal is to put limits on the extent of leverage a TBTF can engage in.  This 
reform is equally undesirable per Majone as it proposes to dictate not only 
macroeconomic policy but also microeconomic policy, something that is reserved for 
the member state.  There is also the possibility to create a European FDIC.  A European 
resolution authority like the FDIC would give the EU more options when dealing with a 
failing institution than just a straight bailout.  While that may be less of an offense to 
the Majone framework than an outright EU sponsored bailout, it still would require 
public funds and would therefore be an act of redistribution.81  The extent to which 
these reforms may or may not be effective in dealing with the financial integration 
problems Europe is facing is immaterial at the moment.  The single criterion is to 
consider if a reform engages in behavior outside the prescribed role of the regulatory 
state.  When it comes to providing liquidity to failing financial institutions, none of the 
discussed reforms are consistent with the role of a regulatory state. 
 
It is important to mention here, though, that there actually was not any EU backed 
bailout of banks.  All the public money used to stabilize failing financial institutions 
came from national sources.  The EU was used as a vehicle of ad hoc coordination to 
facilitate cross-boundary stabilization.  Accordingly, the primary criticisms over the 
reaction to the GFC in how it conflicts with the role of the regulatory state are fixed on 
proposed reforms that would formalize action at the EU level resulting in either 
macroeconomic intrusion or wealth redistribution.  However, this may be splitting hairs.  
                                                
80 Cukierman (2010) pg.4 section 2.3.1. 
81 Dewatripont, Nguyen, Praet, and Sapir (2010). 
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Is there much of a difference between EU backed action and EU backed coordination in 
terms of its desirability?  While EU backed coordination in a regulatory state is more 
desirable than EU backed action, it does not mean that all levels of coordination are 
desirable.  In some ways the distinction between the EU coordinating a response to a 
crisis and executing a response could become a distinction with no difference.  This 
thesis does not pretend to have an answer for this question and therefore leaves it open 
for future discussion.   
 
4.2.2 Undesirable and Illegitimate Reaction to the SDC  
 
The SDC, like the GFC that preceded it, posed a potential catastrophic risk of 
destabilization throughout Europe.  Only this time it was not a problem created by the 
excessive risks of a TBTF, it was the excessive spending by one of the member states to 
the EMU.  Despite the prohibition enshrined in Maastricht against a bailout of a 
member country, the Eurozone nevertheless coordinated a bailout package totaling 110 
billion euro in available assistance for Greece.  While it can be argued that EU 
institutions in response to the GFC largely did not deviate from their pre-existing roles 
(though they might have gone beyond their pre-existing script82), the same cannot be 
said of the way the EU handled the SDC.  Much of this is because there was never a 
plan in place to deal with the eventuality of state default in the first place.  If anything, 
the bailout prohibition would seemingly signify that the plan was “no plan”.  The SGP 
was devised to control fiscal behavior of all the EMU member states.  If for some 
reason a state did find itself in risk of default, the reasonable assumption would be that 
it would not receive any help.  This is not what happened.  On behalf of failed 
regulatory control and unforeseen consequences of integration, it was decided by the 
powers-that-be in Europe that Greece, much like the bailed-out banks that preceded it, 
was too-big-to-fail.  While the EU taking on the task of bank bailouts stretches the 
boundaries of the role of the regulatory state, their response to the SDC breaks these 
boundaries altogether. 
 
                                                
82 Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2010) p. 366. 
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It is well outside the bailiwick of the EU and the EMU to engage in coordinating a 
rescue package for member states at risk of defaulting on their loans.  Not only is it 
outside their preexisting legal authority, as a function of a regulatory state it is both 
undesirable and illegitimate.  It is equally undesirable and illegitimate for a regulatory 
state to impose the kind of strict austerity measures that Greece has been hit with.  
Within the Majone framework, the EU is not supposed to involve itself in the 
macroeconomic affairs of the many states.  The austerity measures forced upon Greece 
demanding tighter fiscal control, though arguably necessary, is precisely the sort of 
macroeconomic intervention the EU must abstain from.   
 
It is not merely the response on behalf of the EU and EMU members to the situation in 
Greece that strains legitimate governmental action under a regulatory state, it is also by 
the way the discussion has advanced regarding increased coordination of fiscal policy.  
In chapter two, this thesis isolated two fundamental shortcomings with the SGP that 
directly lead to the SDC.  The first was the failure of regulation.  The primary 
responsibility of the SGP was to keep deficit spending and high public debt to a 
minimum.  Despite Greece and many other EMU members violating the terms of the 
SGP, there was no action taken on the part of the regulatory bodies to bring them to 
heel.  Despite the fact that enforcement measures were available to the EU, these 
measures were not employed and in the particular case of Greece, the Council actually 
made the conscious choice to abrogate the EDP.  The second shortcoming is the 
evidence that points to non-competitiveness as a leading cause of countries becoming 
“at risk”.  With the general inability to compete, countries like Greece have not been 
able to grow sustainably.  By not saving during the fat times, Greece had nothing to fall 
back on during the lean times when the GFC hit.  This has pointed to a critical problem 
with the EMU: non-competitive countries spending like there is no tomorrow have a 
huge negative impact on all of the other countries of the Eurozone.  Whether via 
ineffectual policy by the SGP or the result of disastrous national spending policy (or 
both), it does not appear that the current framework is working.  It is tempting to 
advocate for stricter coordination of fiscal policy and more means by which members of 
the EMU can intervene if and when another member engages in risky fiscal behavior.  It 
must be cautioned, however, that unified fiscal policy is not something the regulatory 
state can legitimately engage in.  It is even more illegitimate for the regulatory state to 
 34 
use legal force to enforce the terms of a unified fiscal policy in a particular member 
state.   
 
4.3 The Credibility Crisis Without an Ex Ante Framework 
 
One of the most attractive aspects of non-majoritarian rule, according to Majone, is that 
regulatory bodies, which are insulated from political influences, are better at producing 
credible policy.  In the abstract, this is generally true but there appears to be a rather 
significant deviation when one considers the empirical implications rose by the GFC 
and the SDC.  The regulatory structure in place before the GFC relied on the ability of 
national supervisors to coordinate with one another in the event of a crisis.  There never 
existed a European playbook detailing roles and responsibilities of EU authorities or 
even an outline or a battle plan on how to execute national coordination.  This absence 
of an ex ante framework necessitated the ad hoc coordination outlined in chapter two.  
The situation revolving around the SDC was even more tenuous as not only was there 
no ex ante framework on how to go about developing a bailout of a state in the EMU, if 
anything the assumption was that there never would arise an occasion where a bailout 
would become necessary.  Nevertheless, a bailout did occur as a result of another bout 
of improvised coordination.  These two responses suggest that, ironically enough, the 
regulatory state did not produce credible policy.  
 
The essence of credible policy making is that the law should not only be clear but 
predictable and its applicability not prone to change in the foreseeable future.  Another 
important element of credible policy is that it is sophisticated, or capable enough, to 
deal with the situational realities of the behavior it aims to govern.  This sophistication 
element is key because the clarity and predictability of policy making is all for naught if 
the policy itself is not capable of doing what it is designed to do.  This was the principal 
flaw with the policy in place to deal with the possibility of a financial crisis like the one 
seen in the GFC.  Because standing policy was ineffectual, European leaders had no 
choice but to create new policy on the fly to effectively deal with the crisis.  While this 
ad hoc reaction to events appears to have worked to solve the immediate issues brought 
about by the crisis, as a long term strategy for dealing with future crises it leaves a lot to 
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be desired.  The absence of a framework to deal with the SDC can also be described as 
not having sophisticated enough policy to deal with a potential crisis.  While the 
circumstances are different in that the absence of a policy framework for handling the 
potentiality of a member state defaulting on their loan obligations was done 
intentionally, this intention did not factor in the possibility that inaction in this regard 
could prove cataclysmic for the entire EMU.  As such, it can be seen that the regulatory 
state failed to produce credible policy due a lack of sophisticated policy. 
 
The ad hoc approach to crisis management is also the antithesis to credible policy 
making because it is unpredictable.  While the ad hoc approach to the GFC was 
sufficient and timely enough—if only bareley so—the undesirability of this sort of 
haphazard coordination as a long-term strategy for crisis management is due to the fact 
that it does not produce credible policy.  Without a framework, there is no indication 
that the EU, given a future crisis, will behave in the same way.  With a workable 
framework in place, actors will be able to base important decisions throughout all stages 
of a crisis on what they know the government will do.  Without a framework, these 
actors must base these important decisions in a cloud of uncertainty and hastiness, 
potentially making crisis situations even worse.  Many of the proposed reforms that 
have been discussed in this thesis could likely aid in this regard.  For instance, the 
formalization of the ECB as a lender-of-last-resort would give assurance to large cross-
boundary institutions that a last gap option is available should the risk they engage in 
prove to be overreaching.  This assurance benefits not only the at-risk institution but 
also the plethora of secondary actors as well including debt holders, stockholders, 
national governments, and many others.  The formation of a European resolution 
authority would provide similar assurance to secondary actors that in case of default, a 
systematic regime of restructuring and resolution of assets would assure at least a 
marginal return to investors.   
 
The lack of a framework for dealing with another potential SDC is even more 
problematic to credible policy.  The political will of the European citizen to bailout 
Greece was very weak.  Couple this reluctance with the understanding that the EMU 
was never envisaged to be faced with the dilemma of bailing out a member country; it 
was reasonable to have assumed that a bailout would never have occurred.  In contrast 
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to the GFC response, which was swift and decisive, the vacillating response to the SDC 
was cumbersome, protracted and characterized by the controversial implications 
surrounding the events.  For instance, the indecisive action was not only predicated on 
the dilemma proposed by whether to bailout Greece or not on behalf of the EMU 
member states, pride also had a stake. The IMF approached the EU early in the process 
but their offers for assistance were not accepted, at least initially.  It was, after all, an 
embarrassing affair for the EMU.  If IMF assistance were accepted early on, it would 
have been an admission that the Eurozone had serious problems that it was not able to 
resolve itself.  Unfortunately it appears the old adage pride cometh before the fall is true 
at least in this case as IMF assistance was eventually used in addition to European 
funds.  The added misfortune is that according to some, had the IMF been brought in 
early, a European funded bailout never would have been necessary.  If so, the inaction 
by the EU early on in the process may have made the situation in Greece even worse or 
harder to resolve. 
 
All of these factors produced an uncertain environment.  No one could have predicted 
whether or not the EU would have reacted, and if they did, no one could know what that 
reaction would look like.  The present situation is altogether worse because the cost of 
inaction has proved damaging.  Per Maastricht, bailouts are still not supposed to 
happen.  However, now that a bailout has occurred, there is a possibility that it might 
happen again.  The “if”, “when”, and “how” as well as under what circumstances 
another bailout would arise are pure conjecture.  Under this environment, the only 
constant seems to be that inaction and indecision are inevitable.  The Eurozone would 
be better served by making its position clear, one way or the other, on what would 
happen in the event of another SDC.  By developing an unambiguous framework 
outlining exact roles and responsibilities, the Eurozone can save itself from the ravages 
of inaction and indecision in the future.   
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This analysis suggests that the Majone framework cannot legitimize the response by the 
EU to the GFC and the SDC.  Furthermore, it also strongly suggests that the framework 
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suffers a functionality deficit.  This raises a potentially worrisome state of affairs for the 
effectiveness of the EU as a regulatory state.  Is it possible that the limits of the 
regulatory state make it too feeble to deal with the problems facing an integrated 
Europe?  If truly effective control over integration and crisis management or crisis 
prevention means that the EU must involve itself into the macroeconomic decisions of 
the member states or open itself to facilitate the rescue of states or financial institutions 
at risk of default via the redistribution of funds, then this type of governmental power 
cannot find legitimacy through the Majone framework.  If this premise is indeed 
correct, then it stands to reason that the EU may have the difficult decision of choosing 
between an illegitimate but functional government, or a legitimate but dysfunctional 
government.  This underlining premise will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
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5 SOLVING THE FUNCTIONALITY DILEMMA 
 
The effort of this thesis to this point has been to critique the EU as a regulatory state, 
not on normative grounds, but on its functionality.  It has largely been assumed that the 
regulatory state is an effective means of supra-national governance.  This thesis has 
tested that assumption by applying the empirical implications of the GFC and the SDC.  
These findings suggest that the regulatory state is not as functional as previously 
assumed.  The responses to the GFC and the SDC have not conformed to the designated 
role the regulatory state can legitimately engage itself in.  If one presumes that these 
illegitimate responses were necessary and no conceivable legitimate action could have 
forestalled the effects of the two crises or could have prevented them from occurring, 
then it can be said that the regulatory state in its current form suffers from a 
functionality deficit.  This deficit is exacerbated by the absence of credible policy.  
Many of the suggested reforms would go a long way towards creating credible policy, 
however, it would not be legitimate.  This is the exemplification of the dilemma of the 
choice between an illegitimate but functional government, or a legitimate but 
dysfunctional government. 
 
In this final chapter, the principle aim will be to find a way around this undesirable 
dilemma.  In order to do so, I will attempt to rework the Majone framework so that it 
produces a regulatory state that is both legitimate and functional.  Through the course of 
this endeavor, I will dissect Majone’s thesis even further, identifying the genesis of his 
framework’s legitimizing power and then apply it to a better functioning system.  The 
resulting rework would help give more functionality to the framework while preserving 
its legitimacy but does so at a cost.  In time, these costs could prove to be just as 
undesirable as the dilemma over functionality vs. legitimacy.  This analysis suggests 
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that the regulatory state thesis is not sustainable as a governing system and raises 
additional questions on the future of Europe. 
 
5.1 Of the Origins of Legitimacy 
 
Many authors have advocated that the only way to have legitimate political authority is 
via democracy.  Democracy as a concept, however, is not universally accepted. To 
some, the tenacity of a flawed paradigm that equates democracy with majoritarian rule 
neglects the non-majoritarian model as another means of democracy.83  In this respect, a 
non-majoritarian model of democracy can provide democratic legitimacy just as much 
as the majoritarian model can.  Majone embraces the non-majoritarian model over the 
majoritarian model and builds his entire thesis upon the normative assumption that the 
non-majoritarian model legitimizes political power.  This thesis has worked under this 
assumption.  Now, Majone’s vision of non-majoritarian democracy will be scrutinized 
to isolate the essential legitimizing characteristics of non-majoritarian rule and 
determine if they are indeed legitimizing.    
 
The basic principle of non-majoritarian democracy is that the majority is not privileged 
to rule absolutely.  Their political power is constrained in the interest of the minority.  
Protection against majority rule is instituted via a constitutional system where 
governmental powers are checked and individual rights are granted.  In such a system, 
the government is constitutionally constrained as minority rights guarantee that there 
are some areas that governmental authority cannot tread.  To use the nuclear example of 
this—consider a country with a constitutional democracy where slavery is considered a 
violation of a person’s fundamental rights, if a majority decided one day that they 
wanted to institute a system of slavery, that majority would not be able to.  When the 
two come into conflict, the need to protect the right of the individual is more important 
than prevailing democratic desire.  Majone and others describe this constrained system 
of democracy as Madisonian.84 
 
                                                
83 Lijphart (1991) p. 483-494. 
84 See for instance Dahl (1950). 
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Majone takes the concept of Madisonian democracy and runs with it.  By making an 
assertion that the Madisonian model of non-majoritarian democracy is legitimate, 
Majone extends a line of rationalization that bestows legitimacy to all forms of non-
majoritarian rule.  In particular, Majone uses the Madisonian model as a foundation for 
regulatory state legitimacy where rule making is delegated to non-political actors.  This 
extension of the Madisonian model focuses more on the anti-democratic elements of the 
Madisonian design making for a slight perversion of true Madisonian democracy.  For 
example, Madisonian democracy is the product of a tension between two conflicting 
desires of Madison: on one hand he wanted to protect against the tyranny of the 
majority while on the other he wanted a democracy that would respond to the wishes of 
the people.  For Majone, he suffers not from a similar tension preferring outright the 
anti-democratic element (or as he characterizes it, the non-majoritarian element) to the 
democratic element (or the majoritarian element).  This overt preference excludes the 
other side of the coin and therefore does not produce something akin to Madisonian 
democracy but rather something that perennially over represents minority interests over 
majority interest.   
 
Majone’s treatment of the tyranny of the majority is abstract when it is meant to be 
specific.  In a democracy, there is nothing intrinsically wrong when the majority gets 
their way.  To legitimately abstain from the majority’s will, there must be an 
overwhelming and specified reason for protecting minority interest.  For Madison, these 
reasons arise when the majority seeks either to trample upon the rights of the individual 
or to circumvent the authorities afforded to it under the constitution.85.  Majone’s 
embrace of the tyranny of the majority rationale fails to isolate a specific protection for 
the minority.  Instead, the prevailing interest worthy of protection is the perceived 
benefits associated with delegated rule-making and is therefore left to the discretion of 
the regulator.  The regulator in this role assumes a function similar to that of the Court: 
an independent, politically removed governmental organ responsible for the protection 
of minority interest in a polity.  A significant distinction being that a regulator’s 
                                                
85 A problem of the tyranny of the majority can also manifest when a majority bloc and 
a minority bloc becomes institutionalized over many voting cycles.  The antidote for 
this, according to Madison, is to have a large republic where factions are numerous and 
fluid.  This particular problem is not as relevant to this thesis.  
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function derives not from a constitution but from the direction determined by either a 
legislative or executive branch of government.  As a result, the regulator, unlike the 
Court, is not necessarily apolitical.  Furthermore, whereby the Court passes judgment 
protecting minority interest within the enumeration of law, the regulator produces 
policy within its mandate.  The authority and legitimacy of the Court, therefore, derives 
from the law.  The authority and legitimacy of the regulator, however, is passed down 
to it from another branch of government.86  
 
This is not a desirable approach at obtaining legitimacy but this approach must also be 
weighed with the alternative.  For Majone, and others, the prospect of majority rule 
within the EU is undesirable.87  When one considers the rather significantly stratified 
identities within the EU that are fragmented along linguistic, national, cultural, 
religious, and historical lines, the argument against majority rule is convincing.  This 
leaves two undesirable options.  To guard against the ill effects of majoritarianism in a 
plural society, a veto system could be devised requiring unanimity before any law could 
be passed.88  By giving a veto to every party, a unanimous vote would reflect a 
generally shared opinion.  This “least common denominator” would ensure that policy 
would at the very least not be parasitic to any of the parties.  This is in fact what Pareto-
optimality is all about.  If coordination of the EU via the regulatory state can live up to 
the Hippocratic oath of “first do no harm,” then the added benefits associated with 
regulation seem to make it a better option than majority rule.  This does not make 
Majone’s non-majoritarian argument for legitimacy desirable; it makes it the least 
offensive.  As such, it is as legitimate as the EU can currently get.  This rationalization 
is the product of the analysis in chapter 1.1.3 regarding the new standard of legitimacy 
that Majone proposes: the regulatory state is legitimate not because it is democratic, but 
because it is the most effective and least offensive means of EU governance.  This 
thesis accepts Majone’s new standard with the understanding that it may not be ideal, 
but it is better than the alternative.   
 
                                                
86	  For disagreement with this level of delegation, see McNammara (2002). 
87 Lijphart (1984). 
88 Bellamy (2010). 
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5.2 A Better Functioning Framework 
 
The above analysis over the origins of regulatory state legitimacy gives increased 
insight to the importance of governmental roles.  It is imperative that the regulatory 
state does not engage in matters of macroeconomics or redistribution.  These are not 
Pareto-optimal solutions and are therefore not legitimate.  This proves to considerably 
constrain what the regulatory state can do.  The EU must therefore make do with the 
tools at its disposal.  The question chapter three left with was to what extent the limited 
tools available to the EU as a regulatory state were sufficient for meeting the demands 
of integration.  This analysis suggests that integration has created demands that a 
regulatory state cannot resolve legitimately.  Before credence can be given to this 
conclusion, however, one must first consider if the failure of the regulatory state during 
the GFC and the SDC was due not to a lack of tools, but of poor execution. 
 
5.2.1 A failure of Execution 
 
Even the best-laid plan will fail if the execution is poor.  Chapter two has highlighted 
integral areas where regulation failed opening up the possibility that reform of the 
framework may not be needed if it can be argued convincingly that the failure of 
regulation was due to poor execution.  There is some merit to this possibility.89  This 
thesis has discussed research that shows fiscal responsibility is very closely related to 
healthy economies.  The SGP was envisaged to be the key coordination tool to ensure 
that the economies of the EMU did not excessively spend.  If the SGP succeeded in 
enforcing fiscal responsibility amongst the EMU economies, then Greece may never 
have come close to default.  EMU regulators did not exhaust, or even entertain, the 
remedies available to them.  Perhaps it is this lack of execution that failed and not the 
SGP?  
 
This thesis cannot give a definitive answer one way or the other as it is impossible to 
fully predict how events might have been different.  It seems reasonable that better 
                                                
89 Pisani-Ferry (2010). 
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execution would certainly not have made the situation worse, but it is hard to say how 
significantly it could have improved it.  This thesis has also argued that fiscal discipline 
in itself is not necessarily indicative whether or not an economy is secure.90  Stable 
growth via a competitive economy and the need to be able to build reserves during the 
prosperous time of the financial cycle are just as important.  As the SGP does not seek 
to regulate this, no amount of better enforcement of the SGP would do a thing.  Even if 
one contends that tighter fiscal policy could have prevented the SDC, one must consider 
then the argument that the SGP, in its current form, is simply not strong enough to 
guarantee it.  Even if the EMU had exhausted all of its remedies, they still would not 
have had the authority to stop Greece from spending.  Research shows that fiscal rules 
are only effective when backed by consequences.91  Unless the consequence is severe 
enough, instituting rules for fiscal behavior is a hollow act.  Unfortunately, instituting 
severe punishment starts to approach upon the macroeconomic sovereignty of states, 
making what potentially could be effective reform illegitimate.  
 
5.2.2 An Alternative View: Inaction is Better than Action 
 
One must also consider the veracity of the doomsday scenario so many assumed would 
result if nothing were done.  Governmental action in the GFC was justified on the 
understanding that inaction would have made for an even worse situation.  While many 
of the world’s governments reacted within this premise, there are many voices that 
argue against governmental intervention into the financial markets.  This argument is 
that while there may be a deep recession in the short run as liquidity dries up and 
economies come to a halt, the market will quickly come back stronger and healthier 
than before.  Governmental intervention might keep an economy from hitting rock 
bottom, but its recovery is sluggish and artificial.  From this view of the market, events 
like the GFC can be good and necessary thing as they purge what is wrong with an 
economy (e.g. companies that engage in overly risky behavior).  By not letting poorly 
managed institutions fail, however, a government encourages moral hazard and in a 
                                                
90 See sections 2.3 and 3.2.2. 
91 Alesina (2010). 
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sense is not solving a crisis, but delaying it.  In this way, the doomsday scenario is 
overhyped.  
 
A similar argument had been made over the situation in Greece.  While EU action was 
predicated upon the fear of what would result from a Greek default, not everyone 
believes that fear was warranted.92  According to this alternative view, the bailout of 
Greece was not necessary to save the Euro from collapse.   On the contrary, allowing 
Greece to default would have been the best option for strengthening the Eurozone.  
While investors would have lost money, the currency itself would have been unaffected.  
This alternative view also advocates that the fear of contagion is misplaced.  The 
possibility of spillover effects is entirely self-inflicted and could easily be resolved if it 
were made clear that no bailouts would occur.  Included in this is the contention that 
there was an overstatement over the systemic risk associated with the Greek’s financial 
situation.  If so, this alternative view suggests that not only was EU action not necessary 
but also it probably did more harm than good. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to speak authoritatively to the veracity of either the 
major view or the alternative view.  This distinction is nevertheless quite significant.  
Depending upon one’s view, the EU must either swiftly formalize a number of 
centralized mechanisms of oversight and action in order to effectively manage the 
growing complexity of European integration, or it must instead do the opposite by 
leaving member states to their own devices and holding them to account for failures 
resulting from poor fiscal management.  This has dramatic implications for the 
regulatory state.  If the alternative view is correct, then very little stress is put upon the 
regulatory state to expand outside of its legitimate parameters.  If, however, the 
majority view is correct, then the regulatory state is in the precarious position of 
needing to change, resulting in the dilemma of legitimacy vs. functionality.  In the 
following section, this thesis will assume the premise of the majority view.  The 
purpose for the reworking of the Majone framework is to find a regulatory state that is 
as functional as possible while still being legitimate.  Therefore, if the alternative view 
                                                
92 Cochrane (2010). 
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is correct, then nothing is really lost.  However, if the majority view is correct, then the 
EU will benefit from a better functioning framework.   
 
5.2.3 The Majone Framework Revised 
 
The first step to a revision of the Majone framework is to fix its credibility issues.  One 
of the key benefits of the regulatory state is that it produces credible policy, the fact that 
it has not demonstrates that reform is clearly needed.  The primary cause of the current 
accountability dilemma is the absence of an ex ante framework for the handling of a 
future financial and/or sovereign debt crises.  An immediate fix could be to assure that a 
future bailout of a country within Europe will not occur again.  Legally, this may 
require a reworking of the language in Maastricht where the possibility of a bailout can 
be justified under Article 103a.2 that reads: 
 
 Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe 
difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its 
control, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Community financial 
assistance to the Member State concerned. 
 
By making it understood that “exceptional occurrences beyond its control” does not 
extend to self-inflicted occurrences (e.g. excessive public debt and deficit spending), 
EMU members will know that EU bailouts are clearly prohibited under the law.  This 
will guard against moral hazard problems while ensuring credible policy. 
 
The downside to this is what happens in the event of another sovereign debt crisis.  The 
best the EU can do is exhaust all possible preventative measures at its disposal.  More 
effective regulation under the SGP could help.  Included in this is an effective system of 
surveillance and transparency.  While the SGP may not be capable at preventing 
another sovereign debt crisis by itself, ensuring fiscal responsibility will help.  In 
addition, the goals outlined in the 2020 strategy are a good beginning for long-term 
competitive economies, though these goals are not fully adequate.  It is plausible that a 
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commitment to education, R&D, and employment are worthwhile endeavors and would 
help the EU economy.  However, the 2020 strategy is a reaction to the GFC and does 
not factor in the issues raised by the SDC.  As the 2020 strategy is largely a reiteration 
of the earlier Lisbon goals, before the EU should go ahead with the 2020 strategy, it is 
wise that it should first discuss how and why the Lisbon strategy failed.93  This 
discussion might yield what the EU’s core problems are.  As the 2020 strategy stands 
now, EU countries are faced with a trilemma: reducing the public deficit, investing in 
going green, and preserving the welfare state and public services.94  It is difficult to 
imagine that many countries, especially countries with underperforming economies, 
would be able to meet all of these objectives.  A commitment to competitiveness is 
important, but it may be worthwhile to return to the drawing board. 
 
In the end, any plans to improve competitiveness must ultimately be honored by each 
country.  It would be illegitimate for the EU to actively involve itself in the 
macroeconomic policies of its member states.  This opens up the possibility that some 
may not live up to their obligations.  In such a circumstance, the EU must be prepared 
to let countries face the music.  While this very well could result in poor conditions for 
the country in default, the EU at large can find ways to insulate itself from negative 
spillovers. 
 
From a certain perspective, the SDC is a fiction.  In essence, the SDC is just a 
continuation of the GFC.  The argument that has been proffered over the need to bailout 
Greece was due to the destabilizing inevitability of a Greek default.  This 
destabilization would occur on behalf of a domino effect of banks throughout Europe 
holding Greek credit that would go under because they would not be able to withstand 
the shock of a Greek default.  If so, a Greek default is not a sovereign debt issue, it is a 
financial liquidity and solvency issue.  By allowing Greece to default, the EU could 
have instead turned its attention to the European banks just as they had done during the 
GFC.  The only crisis the EU needs to worry about then is how to handle the systemic 
effects of a TBTF.  By allowing overextended countries to default, the regulatory state 
                                                
93 Bonggardt and Torres (2010). 
94 Pochet (2010). 
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can devote their attention to coordinating reaction to important pan-European banks 
saving themselves from the temptation to impose needless illegitimate bailouts.   
 
Treating a sovereign debt situation as a financial crisis gives increased functionality to 
the regulatory state while maintaining its legitimacy.  The response to the GFC has 
shown that the EU can react decisively and effectively.  The EU would be better served 
if a framework were instituted formalizing this decisive and effect reaction to the GFC.  
This would take the guesswork out of how coordination will ensue in the future.  So 
long as the regulatory state acts as a vehicle of coordination whereby the states for 
whom the failing financial institutions reside come together to do a bailout and not the 
EU, than the regulatory state can maintain its legitimacy.  This is essentially what 
transpired during the GFC.  The key for the EU is to devise a sophisticated coordination 
mechanism.  The arrival of another financial crisis in Europe is only a matter of time 
and when it arrives, the level of integration and increase of pan-European banks will 
make the next attempt at coordination harder.  
 
This approach is not perfect.  By not allowing the EU to step into the role of a 
centralized European source for bailouts, coordination amongst the member states must 
work.  If it does not work, then Europe would have to bear the brunt of a financial 
collapse.  Additionally, by allowing member states to default, the EU must accept the 
possible negative consequences associated with a failed economy.  As situations would 
inevitably deteriorate in the defaulted state, many citizens of the defaulted state would 
invariably move elsewhere in Europe in the search for jobs and securities.  This could 
put strain on all of the other member states.  If such migration proved overly stressful 
on the other member states, it is conceivable that political will could turn against 
Europe’s single passport policy.  Additionally, the defaulted state might very well be 
forced out of the monetary union perhaps followed by an expulsion of the union itself.  
These series of events could ultimately unravel the EU itself, as states within the union 
would be motivated to institute policies of protectionism via a reinstatement of national 
currency or departure from the EU.   
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5.3 What is the EU? 
 
The EU is an interesting study for legal scholars.  Its formation has resulted in a number 
of discussions over what its legal institutions should look like and what their 
competencies should be.  Above all, the EU is a reminder that the question over 
legitimate political power is a living discussion.  The arguments on the EU’s democracy 
deficit exemplify the relevance of this discussion. The arguments on the EU’s 
democracy deficit also exemplify a major disconnect among academics, lawyers, 
politicians, and European citizens.  Majone contends that the EU is still in the standard 
setting stage of establishing a criterion over how legitimate power is to be judge.  All of 
the arguments over the EU’s democracy deficit debate represent a preconceived 
standard based upon a preconceived view of what the EU should be.  This is the key 
disconnect, not everyone agrees on what the EU is, or more importantly, what it should 
become.   
 
The current state of affairs in the EU is that there is deep financial integration via the 
single market and a common currency but there is no comparable political integration.  
European citizens are still skeptical over EU institutions preferring instead to be 
governed by national bodies.95  While some have responded to the GFC and the SDC as 
a call for European republicanism, there does not seem to be many European citizens 
willing to take the next step into a United States of Europe.96  Advocates for a European 
republic had hoped that political and social integration in Europe would catch up to its 
financial integration.  Some assumed that once Europe joined together under the EU 
and later with the EMU, full integration was inevitable.  The GFC and the SDC have 
cast serious doubt on the inevitability of European integration along political and social 
lines.  Instead, the wisdom of European integration itself, to the extent that it has 
expanded, is under scrutiny.  Many currently question the introduction of countries like 
Greece into the union in the first place.  Furthermore, the formation of the Eurozone 
with many diverse economies, which is inconsistent with the OCA theory, looks 
foolhardy in retrospect.  This realization has encouraged some to call for Germany to 
                                                
95 Rohrschneider (2002). 
96 Colligon (2010).  
 49 
exit the Euro and go back to the Mark.97  Others have proposed a dual currency union 
with one Euro for the core economies and another for the periphery economies.98  The 
two crises have refueled a debate that has been around since the beginning: no one 
agrees on what the EU is or what it should be.  There is no unified vision; there is no 
unified design. 
 
This crisis of observation is similar to the old fable of the blind man and the elephant.  
As the story goes, each blind man feels a separate body part of the elephant (e.g. a leg, 
an ear, a trunk, etc.) and concludes that particular part they felt constitutes what an 
elephant is.  Blind to the totality of its parts, each of the blind men argues over what 
they believe to be an elephant.  They are both right and wrong at the same time.  
Europe, like the blind men, does not share a single version of what the EU looks like.  
Is it a federation, is it a confederation, is it a democracy, is it a financial union, is it a 
political union, or is it a regulatory state?  How can anyone agree on a standard of 
legitimate political power when no one can first agree on which part or parts define the 
EU?  It is difficult to say whether the blind men of Europe will ever be able to agree on 
what their elephant looks like.  The old fable itself does not offer any assurances.  
While some versions end with resolution, others do not suggesting the debate will 
continue for sometime to come.  Considering the implications brought about by the 
GFC and the SDC, one is apt to assume that Europe will continue to deliberate over 
what their future should look like.  If so, their search for the elephant, like the blind men 
in the poem by John Godfrey Saxe, is ongoing: 
 
And so these men of Indostan   
Disputed loud and long, 
Each in his own opinion  
 Exceeding stiff and strong,  
Though each was partly in the right,   
And all were in the wrong! 
So oft in theologic wars, 
                                                
97 Ipsos pool showing majority of Germans want the return of the deutschemark: The 
Sydney Morning Herald (2010). 
98 Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010).  
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The disputants, I ween, 
Rail on in utter ignorance 
Of what each other mean, 
And prate about an Elephant 
Not one of them has seen! 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has sought to advance legal scholarly discussion over legitimate political 
power within the European Union.  As jurists, it is necessary to consider the legitimate 
ramifications of the institution of legal institutions at the supra national level.  The 
debate over legitimate political power in Europe, or the lack thereof, is commonly 
referred to as the European Union’s democracy deficit.  There are a myriad of voices in 
this debate.  Some argue for increased democratization of European institutions while 
others argue against it.  One of the more technocratic voices arguing against 
democratization is that of Giandomenico Majone.  Majone contents that the European 
Union is a regulatory state and can be legitimized by a non-majoritarian standard.  This 
alternative standard severely constricts the sort of policy the European Union can 
legitimately engage in.  According to Majone, the regulatory state only involves itself in 
matters of market regulation.  It must leave macroeconomic regulation and wealth 
redistribution to the member states.  The wake of the Global Financial Crisis and the 
Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis has put strain on these limitations.  This thesis has 
outlined the response to these two crises and many proposed reforms and has found that 
the regulatory state may not be capable of meeting the demands of European 
integration. The heart of the Majone regulatory state thesis is a legitimizing framework.  
It is merely assumed that it is also functional.  The two recent European crises cast 
doubt on this assumption.  This suggests that Europe may have the undesirable dilemma 
of choosing between 1) a functional yet illegitimate government whereby a 
democratically deficient centralized body involves itself in wealth redistribution and 
member state macroeconomics, or 2) a legitimate yet dysfunctional government 
whereby the needs of integration are not met by capable policy, the effects of which 
could prove damaging.   
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Considering the undesirability of forced political and social unification via the 
democratization of European legal institutions due to the deep cleavages among 
member states and Europeans, this thesis agrees with Majone that legitimacy through a 
non-majoritarian framework is the best option.  The task is then to make this legitimate 
political authority as functional as possible at meeting the demands of European 
integration.  This thesis has endeavored to do that by proposing reforms that are both 
legitimate and functional.  In the end, though, the nebulous nature of the European 
Union prevents the formation of long-term legitimate and functional reform.  Before 
Europe can advance its legal institutions to meet the next financial crisis, it must first 
resolve its identity crisis. 
 
This conclusion mirrors in part some of the other criticisms levied upon Majone 
concerning the feasible distinction between negative a positive integration within 
Europe. With the two crises still relatively young at the time of this writing, time and 
further research will continue to shed more light on the ability of the regulatory state to 
effectively and legitimately create law.  Accordingly, this thesis in no way speaks 
conclusively on the future of European regulatory rule or the European Union’s 
democracy deficit.  What this thesis does ultimately suggest is that the two crises have 
given a renewed perspective upon which to judge many of the long standing theories.  
Hopefully this will invite more discussion and research over the legitimate rule of law 
in Europe. 
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